Safety and Training

Airplanes R Us: The ICAO Flight Plan Form, A Story (Second of Three Installments)

From the October 2019 newsletter, by John Meyers, page 6

Open the PDF at page 6 See the whole October 2019 issue

THE NIGHT I STRUGGLED WITH AN INTERNATIONAL FLIGHT PLAN The research for ICAO flight plan information sent me to my old files. Viola! I found an old flight plan from a notable United flight, dated 13 July 2001. Normally we, as flight crew, didn’t get involved in the actual filing of a formatted ICAO flight plan since our Dispatch division accomplished that item. At the flight planning session, in this case, United 0815 from LAX, on the evening of 11 July, 2001, we were presented with a proprietary flight plan and weather information which the Dispatcher forwarded for flight crew agreement. No issues were apparent, documents signed (by me, as Captain) and our flight departed on time from Los Angeles (KLAX) to Sydney Australia (YSSY), roughly a 16-hour flight. Three hundred miles to our north, UAL 0863 was similarly planned to leave San Francisco (KSFO) and would parallel us to Sydney. I have no specific memory of this flight until it was well-along … and someone was pulling my toes. I was in a crew rest bunk taking a mid-flight break. It turned out our Dispatcher was calling and commanding a diversion, to which all-hands were needed to make decisions and to accomplish the new flight plan. Our Dispatcher was diverting our flight because of newly forecast Sydney weather (early morning persistent fog). Sydney was still 1060 nm distant, 2.5 hours ahead. We were directed to divert to Noumea (NWWW) for fuel. A legal diversion requires two things: 1) Dispatcher notification, and, 2) ATC clearance. We had one, and now went to work on the ATC part. We were in non-radar environment, Oceanic control (NANDI) as I recall, and Ocean-ic ADS was still experimental.

Complicating factors:

  1. UAL 0863, our “wingtip” buddy was dispatched to do the same diversion.

  2. Both ships had just passed abeam Noumea so would require (nearly) a 180 turn and descent in non-radar environment.

  3. Both ships would need to be initially sorted by NANDI Oceanic for proper airborne separation 4) Noumea was a non-radar destination but did have a tower (presumably awake at 3am local). The runway was suitable for B-747’s.

  4. Noumea weather was OK & it had an ILS. The non-radar environment meant each ship would fly an un-practiced chart-depicted DME arc transition to a final fix, then straight in to the runway (Noumea was off the beaten path for UAL, not a training item).

  5. Noumea’s one runway was standard width and good length for B-747 operations but it had no parallel taxi-way. A turn-around and taxi-back would be required (just like Sequim Valley). Since two B-747’s were arriving, this would require some self-sorting to make the runway and ground operation possible. So how did this all work out ? To be continued… (see next installment, 3 of 3). (Hint: All went well enough… and the ICAO Flight Plan in my present-day home file is a copy of the one created to get from Noumea to Sydney)

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